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THE RIGHT OF PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN 
THE LAW-MAKING PROCESS AND THE ROLE 
OF LEGISLATURE IN THE PROMOTION OF 
THIS RIGHT  
KAREN SYMA CZAPANSKIY AND RASHIDA MANJOO* 
INTRODUCTION 
By definition, a democratic nation has some mechanism through 
which leaders hear from the people. Ordinarily, the mechanism is a 
periodic election during which the people have an opportunity to hold 
leaders accountable.  Between these traditional opportunities for 
democratic involvement, however, should a democratic nation have 
mandatory mechanisms for give and take between legislative leaders 
and the public?  The South African Constitutional Court held that the 
South African Constitution answered that question affirmatively in 
Doctors for Life v. Speaker of the National Assembly.1 By way of 
contrast, no such requirement has been found in the United States 
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 1. Doctors for Life Int’l v the Speaker of the Nat’l Assembly & Others 2006 (12) BCLR 
1399 (CC) (S. Afr.). 
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Constitution.2 In the international human rights arena, the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides 
authority for a mandatory mechanism in General Comment 25, but it 
has attracted little attention.3 As advocates in our respective 
countries, we found the South African decision provocative. This 
article attempts to examine the impact of the requirement in our 
respective contexts, as well as further the discussion in the context of 
international human rights norms. 
As the most recent South African Constitutional Court judgment 
relating to the involvement of citizens in the law-making process, 
Doctors for Life4 gave rise to three crucial issues: first, the nature and 
the scope of the constitutional obligation of a state’s legislative organ 
to facilitate public involvement in its legislative processes and its 
committees, and the consequences of the failure to comply with that 
obligation;5 second, the issue of timing and scope,6  i.e., at what stage 
in the legislative process and the extent to which the Constitutional 
Court may interfere in the processes of a legislative body in order to 
enforce the obligation to facilitate public involvement in law-making 
processes;7 and finally, whether the Constitutional Court is the only 
court that may consider the questions raised.8 This paper will limit 
itself to dealing broadly with the first question, the nature of a 
 
 2. While the right to petition the Congress is well-established, as is the Congressional duty 
to maintain a public journal of its activities and its custom of open hearings, no authority exists 
for a requirement that a member, committee or a house of Congress must solicit input, much 
less facilitate its delivery.  See generally U.S. CONST. art. I. 
 3. International Convenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 25, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 
U.N.T.S. 171 (“Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without any of the 
distinctions mentioned in article 2 and without unreasonable restrictions: 1. To take part in the 
conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives; 2. To vote and to be 
elected . . . ; 3. To have access, on general terms of equality, to public service in his [sic] 
country.”). 
 4. Doctors for Life, 2006 (12) BCLR 1399 (CC) at 36-37 (S. Afr.); see also King & Others 
v Attorneys Fund Bd. of Control & Another 2006 (4) BCLR 462 (SCA) (S. Afr.); Minister of 
Health & Another v New Clicks S. Afr. (Pty) Ltd & Others 2006 (1) BCLR 1 (CC) (S. Afr.); 
Matatiele Municipality & Others v President of the Republic of S. Afr. & Others 2006 (5) BCLR 
622 (CC) (S. Afr.). 
 5. Doctors for Life, (12) BCLR 1399 (CC) at 36-37 (S. Afr.); see also King & Others, 2006 
(4) BCLR 462 (SCA) (S. Afr.); Minister of Health & Another, 2006 (1) BCLR 1 (CC) (S. Afr.); 
Matatiele Municipality & Others v President of the Republic of S. Afr. & Others 2006 (5) BCLR 
622 (CC) (S. Afr.). 
 6. Doctors for Life, 2006 (12) BCLR 1399 (CC) at 36-37 (S. Afr.). 
 7. Id. The separation of powers question is addressed in Dennis M. Davis, Transformation 
and the Democratic Case for Judicial Review: The South African Experience, 5 LOY. INT’L L. 
REV. 45 (2007). 
 8. Doctors for Life, 2006 (12) BCLR 1399 (CC) at 36-37 (S. Afr.). 
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legislative body’s duty to facilitate input, using debates relating to the 
notions of human rights and participatory democracy. 
Legal scholars Carolyn Evans and Simon Evans argue that: 
[I]n established democratic States, legislatures perform 
several distinct functions. They are representative bodies 
providing a mechanism by which citizens participate in 
public affairs and government; they are forums in which 
governments can be held accountable for their conduct; and 
they are (more or less) deliberative law-making bodies. In 
discharging each of these functions they can affect the 
enjoyment of human rights.9 
The role of the South African Parliament as a ‘deliberative law-
making body’ came under scrutiny in the Doctors for Life case, due to 
the applicant’s allegation of an omission in the legislative process. 
The seminal value of this case lies in the three bases of the court’s 
approach to the role of legislatures in promoting human rights and 
democracy through their public participation processes: international 
human rights law, a unique and specific mandatory constitutional 
duty, and a contextual and historical approach to public 
participation.10 The case does not focus on the substance of the 
statutes that were the source of the challenge. Instead, the court, as 
the enforcer of human rights, examined whether the Legislature 
denied the enjoyment of one component of the fundamental human 
right to political participation, the general right to take part in the 
conduct of public affairs. 
This article is underpinned by the knowledge that human rights 
are contestable; that debates about rights are an inescapable part of 
politics; and that, although judicial rulings on rights may derive from 
human rights instruments, such rulings cannot necessarily resolve the 
multi-faceted disagreements at the heart of many rights issues.11 
Henry Steiner’s description of the right to political participation as an 
‘open-textured programmatic right’ which will change in different 
contexts and with experiences finds resonance with the majority 
judgment’s views of the ‘idea of an evolving human right to political 
participation.’12 We support this notion and are of the view that, in the 
 
 9. Carolyn Evans & Simon Evans, Evaluating the Human Rights Performance of 
Legislatures, 6 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 545, 548 (2006). 
 10. See generally, Doctors for Life, 2006 (12) BCLR 1399 (CC) (S. Afr.). 
 11. Evans & Evans, supra note 9, at 550-51. 
 12. Doctors for Life, 2006 (12) BCLR 1399 (CC) at 103-04 (S. Afr.). 
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interest of promoting human rights and democracy, the legislative 
duty to facilitate public participation is an important one. Hence, 
Doctors for Life may provide valuable lessons with respect to citizen 
participation in the law-making process, thereby further promoting 
human rights values of, amongst others, dignity and respect. 
As its thesis, this article draws out and examines two such 
lessons: first, legislation is better when legislators are required to 
invite and attend to public input, and, second, citizenship is better 
when legislators are required to invite and attend to public input.  
Doctors for Life, by requiring legislators to facilitate public 
participation in the legislative process, puts South Africa on the road 
to improving both legislation and citizenship. In the United States, 
without a similar mandate, the road is largely untraveled, to the 
detriment of democracy in the US. While rejecting traditional 
representative democracy as an adequate expression of political 
participation, Doctors for Life does not go as far as it could in terms 
of entrenching public participation in the South African legislative 
process.  Nonetheless, it offers a model of an interim solution that the 
United States can consider, even in light of significant historical and 
contextual differences.  The case also offers a model for international 
human rights exploration in an area of underdeveloped theory, 
especially with regard to enhancing respect and dignity as aspects of 
citizenship in a democratic state. 
In Part I, this article sets the stage for examining Doctors for Life 
with a discussion of the South African and international legal 
provisions applicable to the issue of political participation. Part II sets 
forth a detailed description of the decision in Doctors for Life. Part 
III situates the decision within theories of participatory democracy.  
Drawing on the co-authors’ experiences as advocates in our 
respective countries in Part IV, we each explore an example of 
legislative change and how that process is, or would have been, 
different under the requirements of Doctors for Life. In addition, we 
each comment on the example provided by the other in light of the 
context and history of our home countries. The article concludes by 
examining what contributions the Doctors for Life decision could 
make to the understanding of respect and dignity as components of 
political citizenship in the international human rights context. 
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I. APPLICABLE CONSTITUTIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL 
LAW PROVISIONS 
A.  Legislative Structures and Relevant Provisions 
In South Africa, the national legislative authority is vested in 
Parliament which consists of two houses: the National Assembly 
(NA) and the National Council of Provinces (NCOP).13 The 
Constitution also provides for provincial legislatures and local 
government structures, which have varying degrees of legislative 
power. The NA and the NCOP represent different interests in the 
legislative process, with the NA representing “the people . . . to 
ensure government by the people” and the NCOP representing “the 
provinces to ensure that provincial interests are taken into account” 
in the legislative process.14 The participation of both houses of 
Parliament is required in the legislative process. In the view of the 
court, if either of these democratic institutions fails to fulfill its 
constitutional duty in relation to a bill, which includes the duty to 
facilitate public participation, Parliament has failed to fulfill its duty.15 
The constitutional duty to facilitate public involvement in the 
legislative and other processes is found in section 59(1)(a) for the NA; 
section 72(1)(a) for the NCOP; and section 118(1)(a) for provincial 
legislatures. Section 1(d) sets out the founding values of a multi-party 
system of democratic government, which, according to the court, 
include ensuring accountability, responsiveness and openness.16 The 
Preamble of the Constitution expresses the values that underpin the 
goals agreed upon for the establishment of a society based on 
democratic values: social justice and fundamental human rights.17 The 
Court interpreted the provision in the Preamble which states that 
“[T]he foundations for a democratic and open society in which 
government is based on the will of the people” as indicating that “the 
people of South Africa reserved for themselves part of the sovereign 
legislative authority that they otherwise delegated to the 
 
 13. S. AFR. CONST. 1996 ch. 4, §§ 42 (1),  43(a),  44(1). 
 14. Id. § 42 (3)-(4). 
 15. Doctors for Life, 2006 (12) BCLR 1399 (CC) at 55-56 (S. Afr.). 
 16. Id. at 118. 
 17. S. AFR. CONST. 1996 pmbl. (“We therefore, through our freely elected representatives, 
adopt this Constitution as the supreme law of the Republic so as to—Heal the divisions of the 
past and establish a society based on democratic values, social justice and fundamental human 
rights . . . .”). 
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representative bodies they created.”18 The right to political 
participation is further strengthened by the political rights clause 
found in Section 19 of the Constitution and the clause protecting 
freedom of expression found in Section 16 of the Constitution.19 
Altogether, according to the Court, this language indicates a broader 
notion of political participation than simply the right to vote. 20 
Furthermore, both the 1993 and the 1996 Constitutions provide 
for the establishment of, amongst others, two independent 
commissions to strengthen democratic practices. The Commission for 
Gender Equality (CGE) has as one of its functions, “to promote 
gender equality and to advise and to make recommendations to 
Parliament or any other legislature with regard to any laws or 
proposed legislation which affects gender equality and the status of 
women.”21  The South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) 
similarly has the power to promote the observance of, respect for, and 
protection of fundamental rights through education, monitoring and 
evaluation.22 Both commissions, known as Chapter 9 institutions, have 
parliamentary offices that are involved in public consultation and 
submission of reports on proposed legislation to Parliament. This is 
another unique constitutional provision that allows for the 
achievement of public participation in the legislative process. 
According to the Court, South Africa “[O]pted for a more expansive 
role of the public in the conduct of public affairs by placing a higher 
value on public participation in the law-making process.”23 
B.  International and Regional Obligations 
The Court also asserted that the right to political participation is 
a fundamental human right based on provisions in both international 
and regional human rights instruments. Articles 19 and 25 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 
concerning the freedom of expression right and the political right, 
consist of at least two elements: a general right to take part in the 
conduct of public affairs and a more specific right to vote and/or to be 
 
 18. Doctors for Life, 2006 (12) BCLR 1399 (CC) at 117 (S. Afr.). 
 19. See S. AFR. CONST. 1996 ch. 2, §§ 16, 19. 
 20. Doctors for Life, 2006 (12) BCLR 1399 (CC) at 105 (S. Afr.). 
 21. Comm’n on Gender Equality Act 39 of 1996 pmbl. 
 22. Hum. Rts. Comm’n Act 54 of 1995 pmbl. 
 23. Doctors for Life, 2006 (12) BCLR 1399 (CC) at 115 (S.Afr.). 
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elected.24 Furthermore, the ICCPR guarantees not only the ‘right’ but 
also the ‘opportunity’ to take part in the conduct of public affairs. The 
Court viewed the ICCPR as imposing an obligation on states to take 
positive steps to ensure that their citizens have an opportunity to 
exercise their right to political participation.25 In addition to specific 
articles in the ICCPR, the United Nations Human Rights 
Committee’s General Comment No. 25 encourages States to “adopt 
such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to ensure 
that citizens have an effective opportunity to enjoy the rights it 
protects.”26 
The African [Banjul] Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
(African Charter) is the applicable regional human rights instrument. 
The relevant sections include Article 9 on freedom of expression and 
information, Article 13 on freedom to participate in government of 
country either directly or through freely chosen representatives, and 
Article 25 on the obligation of the state to promote and ensure, 
through teaching, education and publication, respect of the rights and 
freedoms contained in the Charter. The Court affirmed that this last 
provision in the African Charter is more specific than the ICCPR in 
spelling out the obligation of state parties to ensure that people are 
well informed of their political rights.27 
 
 24. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1996, 999 U.N.T.S. 
171. 
 25. Doctors for Life, 2006 (12) BCLR 1399 (CC) at 115 (S. Afr.). Also, in the 
environmental rights sector, the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe’s (UNECE) 
“Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to 
Justice in Environmental Matters”, recognizes the right of people to live in a healthy 
environment, and calls for officials and agencies to provide information and to facilitate 
participation in decision-making. The Declaration links environmental rights and human rights 
and affirms that the involvement of all stakeholders is crucial for sustainable development. The 
principles underlying the adoption of this Convention include government accountability, 
transparency and responsiveness; the granting of rights to the public and the imposition on 
signatories and public authorities obligations regarding access to information and public 
participation and access to justice; and the forging of new processes for public participation in 
the negotiation and implementation of international agreements.  Convention on Access to 
Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental 
Matters, June 25, 1998, 38 I.L.M. 517. 
 26. Office of the U.N. High Comm’r for Human Rights [OHCHR], International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights, General Comment No. 25, adopted July 12, 1996, para. 1, 
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/0/d0b7f023e8d6d9898025651e004bc0eb?Opendocument. 
 27. Doctors for Life, 2006 (12) BCLR 1399 (CC) at 100-01 (S. Afr.). 
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II. OVERVIEW OF DOCTORS FOR LIFE 
A. Facts of the Case 
The applicant in this case, an advocacy organization called 
Doctors for Life,28 complained that, during the legislative process 
leading to the enactment of four statutes, the NCOP and some of the 
Provincial Legislatures did not comply with their constitutional 
obligations to facilitate public involvement in their legislative 
processes. They argued that there had been a failure to invite written 
submissions and conduct public hearings on these statutes. The court 
referred to the four statues collectively as ‘health statutes.’29 
The respondents denied the allegations and argued that both the 
NCOP and the various provincial legislatures had complied with the 
duty to facilitate public involvement in their legislative processes. The 
respondents also challenged the applicant’s assertion as to the scope 
of the duty to facilitate public involvement. Their contention was that, 
although the duty to facilitate public involvement requires public 
participation in the law-making process, essentially all that is required 
of the legislature is to provide is the opportunity to make either 
written or oral submissions at some point in the national legislative 
process. 
B. Holding of the case 
The majority of the Court found that, regarding section 72 (1)(a) 
of the Constitution, Parliament had failed to comply with its 
 
 28. According to the website of Doctors for Life International, “Doctors for Life stands for 
the following 3 principles: For sound science in the medical profession, the sanctity of life from 
conception till death, and for a basic Christian ethic.”  Doctors for Life International, Mission 
Statement, http://www.doctorsforlifeinternational.com/about/mission.cfm (last visited July 29, 
2008). 
 29. See Doctors for Life, 2006 (12) BCLR 1399 (CC) at 36-37 (S. Afr.).  The health statutes 
mentioned included the: Traditional Health Practitioners Act 35 of 2004 (intending to bring 
about a new dispensation of recognizing and regulating traditional health healers); Choice on 
Termination of Pregnancy Amendment Act 38 of 2004 (making provision for registered nurses, 
other than midwives, to perform termination of pregnancies at certain public and private 
facilities); Dental Technicians Amendment Act 24 of 2004 (making provision for persons who 
have been employed as dental laboratory assistants for a period of not less than five years under 
the supervision of a dentist or dental technician, and who have been trained by these 
professionals, to perform the work of a dental technician); and the Sterilisation Amendment 
Act 3 of 2005.  There was no dispute as to whether the National Assembly had fulfilled its 
constitutional obligation to facilitate public involvement in connection with the ‘health statutes.’ 
This had taken place through the acceptance of written submissions made to the National 
Portfolio Committee on Health, and also by the holding of public hearings. 
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constitutional obligation to facilitate public involvement before 
passing the Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Amendment Act 
and the Traditional Health Practitioners Act. Adopting a social and 
historical context approach, the Court held that certain statutes 
require mandatory public consultations.  Which statutes require such 
consultations can depend on such things as the nature and importance 
of the bill, requests received for consultations, and whether or not 
promises had been made in response to such requests.30 Public 
consultations in such circumstances would be an indicator of respect 
for the views of affected people. Adequate consultation is even more 
crucial in contexts where the affected groups have been previously 
discriminated against, marginalized, silenced, received no recognition, 
and have an interest in laws that will directly impact them.31 
Furthermore, in terms of the Traditional Health Practitioners Act, 
the Court recognized the critical role played by traditional health care 
providers in the communities that they served, the standing and status 
that they held in such communities, and also the historically 
demeaning treatment of this sector in South Africa. 
In relation to the Choice on Termination of Pregnancy 
Amendment Act, the Court held that this was not an uncontroversial 
matter, that great interest had been demonstrated by interested 
groups asking the NCOP to hold public hearings, and that 
undertakings were made by the NCOP to get the provincial 
legislatures to hold public hearings. Independent of such requests, the 
NCOP was also of the view that public hearings were necessary on 
this particular Bill. The NCOP was notified about the failure of some 
of the provincial legislatures to hold hearings, despite its undertaking 
to interest groups. Unfortunately, the NCOP did not take any action 
to remedy the situation, including the mandatory obligation to hold 
public hearings at a national level.32 The Court held that “[T]he 
NCOP is not a rubber stamp of the provinces when it comes to the 
duty to facilitate public involvement. It is required by the 
Constitution to provide a ‘national forum for public consideration of 
issues affecting the provinces.’”33 
 
 30. See generally Doctors for Life, 2006 (12) BCLR 1399 (CC) at 146-47, 177 (S. Afr.) 
(outlining and giving examples of reasonableness and unreasonableness in regard to legislative 
consultations with the public). 
 31. See Id. at 163-64. 
 32. S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 59, pt. 1 (regarding hearings at the national level). 
 33. Doctors for Life, 2006 (12) BCLR 1399 (CC) at 173 (S. Afr.). 
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The Court concluded that both the Traditional Health 
Practitioners Act and the Choice on Termination of Pregnancy 
Amendment Act were adopted in a manner inconsistent with the 
Constitution and both were declared invalid.34 Taking into account 
the fact that the statutes had come into effect, and recognizing the 
adverse consequences of an immediate order of invalidity, the order 
of invalidity was suspended for a period of 18 months to enable 
Parliament to re-enact these statutes in a manner consistent with the 
Constitution.35 
C. The Court’s Rationale 
The Court’s interpretation of the Constitutional mandate to 
‘facilitate public participation’ was premised on many factors, 
 
 34. The constitutional challenges relating to two other bills, the Dental Technicians 
Amendment Act and the Sterilisation Amendment Act, were dismissed. This last statute had 
not been passed by Parliament at the time of the application, and, although the statute was 
already passed at the time of writing of the judgment, the Court reached a decision that it did 
not have jurisdiction to hear this, as the legislative process was not complete at the time of 
application. The challenge to the Dental Technicians Amendment Act was dismissed as, after 
having considered the nature of the Bill and the views of the provinces and the NCOP, the court 
concluded that it could not find that the respondents had acted unreasonably in not inviting 
written representations or holding public hearings on this Bill. Furthermore, the Bill had not 
elicited public interest, as evidenced by the fact that no submissions were received when the bill 
was first published for public comment. Hence, there was no breach of the duty to facilitate 
public involvement and the applicant’s challenge to this Bill failed.  Id. at 70-76, 174-75, 177-78. 
 35. Id. at 188-89. Three dissenting judges each issued an opinion. Judge Westhuizen agreed 
with the majority position on the importance of public involvement for democracy, and was 
convinced that there is a constitutional obligation, which must be fulfilled. Nevertheless, he 
argued that section 72(1)(a) does not mandate that the legislature has to hold public hearings, 
nor is it a specific requirement for the passing of every Bill. Also, the provision is not 
constitutionally intended to result in specific legislation being declared invalid by the Court.  Id. 
at 212-21 (Westhuizen, J., dissenting).  Judge Yacoob’s detailed dissenting judgment had the 
support of both Judge Westhuizen and Judge Skweyiya. His focus was on determining what the 
Constitution required both textually and historically, as opposed to using international law 
provisions above constitutional principles, or what the merits of public participation were.  Id. at 
221-307 (Yacoob, J. dissenting). He agrees that the Constitution envisions a relationship 
between representative and participatory elements in South Africa’s democracy. He identifies 
three elements which emphasize the participatory aspects of democracy: universal adult 
suffrage, a national common voters’ roll, and regular elections. The multi-party democracy 
aspect, he argues, points to the representative nature of the democracy contemplated in the 
Constitution. He argues that “[T]he object of all these elements of democracy is to ensure 
accountability, responsiveness and openness. . . . It implies that our democracy requires citizens 
to vote for members of a political party who would represent them. Public involvement in the 
legislative process is not mentioned at all as an essential principle of the Constitution. . . . In our 
constitutional scheme, laws passed by representatives of the people must be regarded as 
government by the people and as laws passed by the people.  This is a vital contextual factor in 
determining what ‘public involvement’ in the Constitution means.”  Id. at 250, 256-57 (Yacoob, 
J., dissenting). 
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including amongst others: provisions in human rights instruments, the 
use of both an historical and a social context approach, an 
acknowledgement of the values of dignity and respect that are 
engendered by public participation in law-making processes, and 
inspiration from a particular vision of a non-racial and democratic 
society based on democratic values, social justice and fundamental 
human rights, in which government is based on the will of the people. 
As discussed in earlier sections,36 the Court’s reference to human 
rights instruments, both international and regional, indicates an 
awareness of the evolving nature of rights and notions of justice. The 
Court re-stated a principle enunciated in a previous decision: “[r]ights 
by their nature will atrophy if they are frozen. As the conditions of 
humanity alter and as ideas of justice and equity evolve, so do 
concepts of rights take on a new texture and meaning.”37 
Historically, the struggles fought against an unjust and 
undemocratic state included the formation of community structures 
based on the concept of ‘people’s power.’ In South African 
communities, the traditional forums for public participation included 
‘imbizos, lekgotlas and bosberaads’. These methods of public 
consultation and participation are used today by the democratic 
government and include the convening of an annual People’s 
Parliament. The Court, in recognizing the significance of public 
participation structures and methods of the past, asserted: 
[Traditional forums] were also seen as crucial in laying the 
foundation for the future participatory democracy that [the 
people] were fighting for and that we are operating under. 
This emphasis on democratic participation that was born in 
the struggle against injustices is strongly reflected in our new 
democratic Constitution and the entrenchment of public 
participation in Parliament and the legislatures.38  
On a global level, the Court recognized that the right to political 
participation dates back to the Middle Ages, and many modern 
constitutions provide forums for public participation in different 
forms and through different processes, including the right to petition, 
present written requests and complaints, and the holding of 
referenda. 
 
 36. See supra Part I.B. 
 37. Doctors for Life, 2006 (12) BCLR 1399 (CC) at 104-05 (S. Afr.). 
 38. Id. at 119. 
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The Court’s focus on the ‘nature’ of South Africa’s democracy 
involved both an historical examination as well as a contextual 
interpretation of the Constitution. The merits and values of a 
participatory democracy in furthering a system of accountability, 
responsiveness and openness in government were widely discussed in 
the judgment. In an earlier case, New Clicks, the Court had held that 
“[t]he Constitution calls for open and transparent government, and 
requires public participation in the making of laws by Parliament and 
deliberative legislative assemblies.”39 
The interpretation of the mandatory obligation on the 
Legislature to facilitate public involvement was also grounded in the 
context of the historical exclusion of the majority of people from 
political processes and the goals in the Constitution to support 
transformation. The Doctors for Life Court recognized two aspects of 
the duty to facilitate public involvement: the duty to provide 
meaningful opportunities for participation in the law-making process 
and the duty to take measures to ensure that people have the ability 
to take advantage of the opportunities provided.40 Hence, “our 
constitutional framework requires the achievement of a balanced 
relationship between representative and participatory elements in our 
democracy.”41 Furthermore, the Court pointed to the transformative 
need for government to respect the dignity of citizens as a way of 
strengthening its conclusion that a special duty existed as regards to 
public participation. The legislature can satisfy its duty in any of a 
number of ways, according to the Court, depending on the particular 
legislative context.  Examples include providing access to Parliament, 
providing an opportunity to submit representations and submissions, 
providing a forum for public hearings for oral submissions, and 
summoning people to Parliament. 
D. Court’s Self-imposed Limits 
At first glance, one can view Doctors for Life as a prime example 
of judicial activism gone too far.  However, a more nuanced reading 
reveals a fairly balanced majority judgment which illustrates a deep 
awareness of the doctrine of separation of powers, the careful use of 
judicial discretion, and acknowledgement of the limitations faced by 
 
 39. Minister of Health & Another v New Clicks S. Af. (Pty) Ltd & Others 2006 (1) BCLR 1 
(CC) at 344-47 (S. Afr.). 
 40. Doctors for Life, 2006 (12) BCLR 1399 (CC) at 24 (S. Afr.). 
 41. Id. at 127. 
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courts. For example, the Court cited the King case, where the 
Supreme Court of Appeal, in dealing with the concept of public 
involvement, made the following observation: 
Public involvement might include public participation 
through the submission of commentary and representations: 
but that is neither definitive nor exhaustive of its content.  
The public may become ‘involved’ in the business of the 
National Assembly as much by understanding and being 
informed of what it is doing as by participating directly in 
those processes.  It is plain that by imposing on Parliament 
the obligation to facilitate public involvement in its 
processes, the Constitution sets a base standard, but then 
leaves Parliament significant leeway in fulfilling it.42 
The Court acknowledged that the legislature will have considerable 
discretion in determining how best to achieve the facilitation of public 
participation. Hence, Parliament must be free to carry out its 
functions without interference and, in terms of section 57 (1) (a) of 
the Constitution it has the power to “determine and control its 
internal arrangements, proceedings and procedures. The business of 
Parliament might well be stalled while the question of what relief 
should be granted is argued out in the courts. Indeed the 
parliamentary process would be paralyzed if Parliament were to 
spend its time defending its legislative process in the courts. This 
would undermine one of the essential features of our democracy: the 
separation of powers.”43 
The determination by the Court is based on a reasonableness test 
that takes into account the factual basis. The Court took into account 
 
 42. Doctors for Life, 2006 (12) BCLR 1399 (CC) at 141-42 (S. Afr.) citing King & Others v 
Attorneys Fidelity Fund Bd. of Control & Another 2006 (4) BCLR 462 (SCA) at 23-24 (S. Afr.). 
 43. Doctors for Life, 2006 (12) BCLR 1399 (CC) at 59-60 (S. Afr.).  The Court was clear 
that the separation of powers principle is not simply an abstract notion. It “. . . has important 
consequences for the way in which and the institutions by which power can be exercised. Courts 
must be conscious of the vital limits on judicial authority and the Constitution’s design to leave 
certain matters to other branches of government.” In a context where the Constitution is the 
supreme law, and where it imposes binding obligations on all branches of government, Courts 
are required by the Constitution ‘to ensure that all branches of government act within the law’ 
and fulfill their constitutional obligations. In terms of section 2 of the Constitution, the 
Constitutional Court “has. . .the responsibility of being the ultimate guardian of the 
Constitution and its values.” “[Y]et, however great the leeway given to the legislature, the 
courts can, and in appropriate cases will, determine whether there has been the degree of public 
involvement that is required by the Constitution.” Thus the Court has a role in deciding whether 
Parliament has fulfilled its obligations, including in providing citizens with a meaningful 
opportunity to be heard.  Id. at 60-63, 128 (citations omitted). 
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questions such as, amongst others, the following: what action has 
Parliament taken? Is it reasonable in all the circumstances? Are the 
rules of Parliament relating to public participation reasonable? How 
controversial is the Bill, and is there a reasonable degree of public 
interest in it? Did the legislation need to be passed urgently?44 
III. THEORIES RELATING TO THE NOTION OF 
PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY 
The judgment in Doctors for Life grounded the right to 
participation in, among other sources, international human rights 
norms.  Henry Steiner, in the article cited by the court, describes the 
international human right to take part in governance as having two 
aspects: the right to vote and the right to participate between 
elections.45  The first is well-developed, while the second, according to 
Steiner, remains rather vague.  Doctors for Life concerns the second, 
less well-developed aspect of the international human rights norm 
concerning public participation in the process of governance between 
elections.46 
In recent years, theoreticians on the subject of participatory 
democracy have identified two models for citizen engagement in 
governance between elections: strong democracy and discourse, or 
 
 44. Id. at 146-47. 
 45. Henry J. Steiner, Political Participation as a Human Right, 1 HARV. HUM. RTS. Y.B. 77, 
78 (1988). 
 46. Both elections and participation between elections are necessary, of course, only if they 
contribute to the legitimacy of the laws adopted through the process.  As Peter Shane has put it, 
Both elections and public deliberations are mechanisms, not ends in themselves. 
The overarching issue is what these mechanisms are intended to achieve. If we start 
from the premise that legitimacy is that quality of government that gives those in 
power the moral authority to impose their will on members of the polity, then, as I 
have argued elsewhere, democracy’s claim to legitimacy rests on two premises. One 
is that, as opposed to other systems, it is more likely to facilitate government 
decision making that at least takes seriously the interests of all persons subject to 
the decision at issue. Equal respect for all persons is thus one of the moral building 
blocks of democratic legitimacy. The second is that, as opposed to other systems, 
democracy empowers individuals with meaningful agency. That is, a democratic 
regime, properly constituted, allows citizens to experience themselves as 
autonomous actors free to participate in the determination of their political fate. 
These are the qualities of government that both elections and public deliberation 
aim to achieve, the ends to which they function as our most powerful means. 
Peter M. Shane, Deliberative America, 1 J. PUB. DELIBERATION 10, 10 (2005) (reviewing 
BRUCE ACKERMAN AND JAMES S. FISHKIN, DELBERATION DAY (2004) and ETHAN J. LEIB, 
DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA: A PROPOSAL FOR A POPULAR BRANCH OF 
GOVERNMENT (2004)). 
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dialogic participation. Both stand in contrast to “thin” or purely 
representative democracy, in which the citizen’s role is to elect 
representatives periodically. Political accountability in a purely 
representative democracy is achieved at the ballot box: those who fail 
to satisfy the electorate are not returned to office in the next election.  
Citizen input between elections is not forbidden, but it is not 
mandated. 
The concept of strong democracy described by Benjamin Barber 
in his book of the same name is characterized by a continuous process 
of citizen deliberation.47 No principle is sacred or beyond change 
through the political process.  Deliberation, or strong democratic talk, 
is at the heart of strong democracy. It is characterized, according to 
Barber, by “listening no less than speaking; second, it is affective as 
well as cognitive; and third, its intentionalism draws it out of the 
domain of pure reflection into the world of action.”48 
Dialogic participation shares with strong democracy a 
commitment to engagement by citizens with one another to develop 
points of view and positions. As described by Jürgen Habermas, 
dialogic participation is process-oriented, rather than protective of 
particular principles.49  Like strong democracy, dialogic participation 
relies on building connections among people and groups; it cannot 
occur if people are isolated from one another. As described by 
Shannon, democratic process requires active, animated citizens, who 
engage with each other to identify and understand their political 
interests, to discover their social values and to decide public issues 
through public debate.  When the process works, public decisions are 
the product of social learning, rather than simply a bureaucratic 
process of proposal and response.50 
According to classic and modern advocates for participatory 
democracy, the more that citizens are engaged in self-governance, the 
more they gain in self-respect, autonomy and empathy for others.51  
As they work together, they learn the art of give and take and 
become more willing to accept decisions that advance the common 
 
 47. BENJAMIN R. BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY: PARTICIPATORY POLITICS FOR A NEW 
AGE at 117-19 (3d ed. 2003). 
 48. Id. at 174. 
 49. Jurgen Habermas, Three Normative Models of Democracy, 1 CONSTELLATIONS 1, 1-10 
(1994), reprinted in CONSTITUTIONALISM & DEMOCRACY 277 (R. Bellamy ed. 2006). 
 50. Margaret A. Shannon, Participation as Social Inquiry and Social Learning, 157 
SCHWEIZ Z. FORSTWES 430 (2006). 
 51. CAROLE PATEMAN, PARTICIPATION AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY 22- 44 (1970). 
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good even when their individual good may be disserved.52  It can serve 
as an antidote to apathy and a tonic for empathy.53 
The judgment in Doctors for Life does not reject representative 
democracy as fundamental to the structure of the South African 
government under the post-apartheid constitution.  Instead, it insists 
that representative democracy is not the only aspect of democracy 
contemplated by that constitution. In addition, the Court concludes 
that the constitution requires some participation between elections.  
The question, then, is what kind of participation is consistent with 
what is fundamentally a representative democratic structure. 
While the boundary between strong democracy and dialogic 
democracy may not be entirely plain, the path taken by the Court in 
Doctors for Life is more within the territory mapped by dialogic 
democracy than strong democracy. For example, while Barber posits 
that agenda-setting must be done through strong democratic talk, 
Doctors for Life puts the question of agenda-setting mainly in the 
hands of the legislature. Legislators must facilitate input, according to 
the court, only as to controversial questions and only using the means 
chosen by the legislators. The decision does not demand, as may be 
true in a strong democracy,54 the reconsideration of basic substantive 
premises concerning, for example, the structure of government and 
the nature of fundamental rights. Under the decision, the process may 
be as limited as the legislature inviting input from the public, but the 
Court encourages legislators to go further. Among the means 
identified by the Court are educating the public about controversial 
topics, soliciting views from affected groups, seeking both oral and 
written submissions, and holding hearings around the country. A 
reader of Habermas would find these techniques for democratic 
participation quite familiar, although Habermas would surely 
encourage the legislature to go further along the road to greater 
social learning, with its concomitant political activity.55 
The process of social inquiry which creates social learning 
includes four aspects: discourse among the actors must create inter-
subjective meaning and express shared understanding, “discussion 
must create and authenticate ‘true’ statements of conditions,” a 
“deliberative process must establish the moral and ethical basis for 
 
 52. See generally id. at 26-31. 
 53. Id. at 104-05. 
 54. See Frank Michelman, Democracy & Positive Liberty, BOSTON REV., Oct./Nov. 1996, at 
3, reprinted in CONSTITUTIONALISM & DEMOCRACY 287 (R. Bellamy, ed. 2006). 
 55. See Shannon, supra note 50, at 432. 
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normative claims of value, priority, and significance,” and the 
“process of participation must ensure the authenticity of the 
participants.”56 When the process of social inquiry is successful,  
“when multiple stakeholders bring together their knowledge, 
experiences, perspectives, values and capacities in a communicative 
process of critical reflection and civic science as a means of jointly 
understanding and addressing shared challenges and potential 
options,” it leads to social learning. 57 
As opposed to a purely representative democracy, either a strong 
or a dialogic democratic process could produce some important social 
and political forces in South Africa as well as in the United States.  As 
the Court in Doctors for Life posits, the relationship between 
legislators and citizens changes when legislators have a duty to 
facilitate input into the legislative process. Legislators are 
demonstrating respect for citizens when they ask their opinion, and 
citizens then learn that their opinions are valued. Their input may 
also change legislation for the better, but that is not the whole point.  
As participatory democratic theoreticians argue, what is “better” 
cannot be objectively determined. What one seeks through the 
participatory process is social learning, in which the realities that each 
participant brings to the table are revealed and discussed and the 
outcomes are negotiated. There is no one best outcome; instead, 
there is a respectful communicative process that leads to the 
identification of outcomes that participants design and can live with.58 
Communication is a two-way street. In a participatory 
democracy, as opposed to a representative democracy, legislators 
must come face-to-face with those who are affected by their decisions, 
and they must ask them for their opinion. Legislators may reject those 
opinions, but they cannot do so without having exposed themselves to 
the arguments, the feelings, and the insights of those who are affected 
by the decision.  For this reason, Barber claims that strong democracy 
 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. See YASH GHAI & GUIDO GALLI, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR DEMOCRACY AND 
ELECTORAL ASSISTANCE, CONSTITUTION BUILDING PROCESSES AND DEMOCRATIZATION 14-
15 (2006) (arguing that public participation can help create a more tolerant and democratic 
society); see Jim Rossi, Participation Run Amok: The Costs of Mass Participation for 
Deliberative Agency Decisionmaking, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 173, 196-206 (1997) (stating that to be 
legitimate, decisionmaking must allow some degree of nonexpert participation, and arguing that 
civic virtue is necessary for a deliberative democracy). 
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“can assure sufficient equality and justice to coexist with a variety of 
economic systems.”59 
Another feature of participatory democracy is that it works best 
when the scale is small enough for people to hear and be heard by 
others. Doctors for Life advances this aspect of participatory 
democracy by stressing that legislators should seek input at the 
provincial level, not just at the national level. Provinces are still rather 
populous for direct democracy, however. The possible antidote 
suggested by Doctors for Life is to focus on groups of interested 
people, rather than solely on individuals. Gathering people together 
to form groups that formulate authentic positions through dialogue is 
at the heart of dialogic democracy as described by Habermas. These 
groups can then engage with one another to negotiate for solutions 
that represent the collaboration of the individuals and the groups. 
Since the Doctors for Life judgment requires legislators to 
consider consulting with groups, it provides an incentive for civil 
society to develop and sustain itself in the hope that groups will have 
influence, especially between elections. The judgment in Doctors for 
Life, possibly provides an incentive for government to assist groups to 
develop, that is, to help people who will be affected by controversial 
legislation to find each other and engage in the kinds of democratic 
talk that allows them to identify solutions they can live with and 
advocate for. According to participatory democracy theoreticians, 
authentic participation does not occur when a government agency 
suggests a solution to a problem and then invites input from affected 
people.60 This is the process most familiar from administrative rule-
making in the United States. What is missing from this process is the 
opportunity for people to talk through the problem, rather than just 
respond to a possible solution or group of solutions.61 Interestingly, in 
the environmental arena, some agencies in the U.S. and elsewhere 
have experimented with a more open and interactive process, 
including aiding groups to come together and providing them with 
access to experts.62 Doctors for Life does not require that legislators 
 
 59. BARBER, supra note 47, at xii. 
 60. Shannon, supra note 50, at 432. 
 61. Cf. Peter Shane, Turning GOLD into EPG: Lessons from Low-Tech Democratic 
Experimentalism for Electronic Rulemaking and Other Ventures in Cyberdemocracy, 1 ISJLP 
147 (2005) (reviewing DEEPENING DEMOCRACY: INSTITUTIONAL INNOVATIONS IN 
EMPOWERED PARTICIPATORY GOVERNANCE (Archon Fung & Eric Olin Wright eds., 2003). 
 62. See generally Rena I. Steinzor, Reinventing Environmental Regulation: The Dangerous 
Journey from Command to Self-Control, 22 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 103 (1998) (discussing 
experiments in pollution controls). 
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undertake such an extensive and expensive process, but it suggests 
that the process is worthwhile for the legislature to consider. 
Another aspect of administrative rulemaking in the U.S. and 
South Africa is that the decisionmaker is required to consider 
comments that are filed and make some response to them before the 
rule is finalized.63 Doctors for Life does not require legislators to 
respond to input. It may be difficult, however, for legislators to listen 
to people as the decision requires and not take their views into 
account, at least to some degree. By listening, legislators may learn 
about the lives of people different from themselves. They may open 
the door to understanding and empathy. Also, those who share their 
views may, quite reasonably, expect their views to make a difference, 
and they may hold accountable a legislator who ignores them. 
Bohman argues that for the adoption of laws, democratic values 
in a pluralist  society are satisfied if three criteria are met. First, the 
laws must “result from a fair and open participatory process in which 
all publicly available reasons have been respected.”64 Second, “the 
outcome is such that citizens may continue to cooperate in 
deliberation rather than merely comply.”65 And, third, “the source of 
sovereign power” is “the public deliberation of the majority.”66 In 
other words, in a pluralist society, not everyone will be happy with the 
outcome of a deliberative process, but everyone should be happy 
enough with the process to have an incentive to continue to try. By 
requiring legislators to openly solicit input, the Court in Doctors for 
Life in effect challenges legislators to take into account Bohman’s 
criteria, particularly the second one. Once they have invited input, 
legislators cannot avoid the task of being accountable to those who go 
to the trouble of giving input. Bohman suggests that accountability is 
achievable without agreement so long as those who give input can be 
persuaded that they should continue to do so regardless of whether 
the outcome tracks their opinion.67 This requires that legislators act 
respectfully during hearings, make themselves open to changing their 
 
 63. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2000); Lloyd Noland Hosp. & Clinic v. Heckler, 762 F.2d 1561, 1565 
(11th Cir. 1985); see also 1 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 7.1 
(4th ed. 2002); Tracy-Lynn Field, Public Participation in Environmental Decision-Making: 
Earthlife Africa (Cape Town) v. Director-General: Department of Environmental Affairs and 
Tourism, 122 S. AFR. L.J. 4, 748, 757 (2005). 
64. JAMES BOHMAN, PUBLIC DELIBERATION: PLURALISM, COMPLEXITY, AND 
DEMOCRACY 187 (1996). 
 65. Id.  
 66. Id. 
 67. See id. at 55 (stating that public deliberation requires a plural accountability). 
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minds, and be prepared to justify their decisions in the same fair and 
open participatory process. 
A criticism of participatory democracy is that it allows the 
majority to overwhelm minorities while, at the same time, does not 
affirm the unchangeable character of certain core values.68 Doctors for 
Life does not go that far down the route toward participatory 
democracy because of its insistence that, whatever participation the 
legislature must facilitate, the process is part and parcel of the 
representative democracy and the unwavering values embodied in the 
South African Constitution.  Indeed, Doctors for Life probably serves 
to enhance the power of minorities, rather than the majority, because 
it provides for specific spaces in which the voices of those affected by 
the legislature must be heard. The plaintiffs in Doctors for Life itself 
are a good example – a group of advocates opposed to broad access 
to abortion is not, in South Africa, a widely popular organization, but, 
under the decision, legislators are required to listen to their views. 
A second criticism of participatory democracy is that it does 
nothing to counteract the silencing of groups historically silenced in 
society.69 In part for that reason, Iris Marion Young recommends 
renaming deliberative democracy “communicative democracy.”70 She 
posits that the argumentative norms of discourse sometimes advanced 
by advocates of deliberative democracy privilege speakers who enjoy 
political and economic advantage and devalue the speech of others.  
Communicative democracy, on the other hand, “attends to social 
difference, to the way that power sometimes enters speech itself, 
recognizes the cultural specificity of deliberative practices and 
proposes a more inclusive model of communication.”71 Her more 
inclusive model aims, like deliberative democracy, to make room for 
people to change their ideas because of their interactions with others, 
including others whose experiences and discursive methods are 
different from their own. To achieve the goal, she recommends 
adopting a discourse that includes narrative, preservation of 
differences in respectful exchanges that enhance social knowledge of 
 
 68. See Michelman, supra note 54. 
 69. See IRIS MARION YOUNG, INTERSECTING VOICES: DILEMMAS OF GENDER, 
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY, AND POLICY 60-74 (1997). 
 70. Id. at 60. 
 71. Id. at 63. 
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all participants, caring for the participants in the exchange, and strong 
rhetoric.72 
In addition to changing the norms of discourse, feminists have 
pointed to the experiences of women within families as a source of 
their silence in public life. For example, family life historically has 
been viewed as a private realm, whereas politics is a public realm.  
Feminists have critiqued this division of the public and the private as 
a way of validating the absence of women from public life, since 
women who can be subject to violence and sexual domination at 
home can be viewed as lacking the agency necessary for participation 
in the public sphere. Further, women have been tasked with the 
responsibility for home while also participating in the paid economy, 
leaving them little time for participation in political activity.73 
The judgment in Doctors for Life specifically identifies the 
historical silencing of the majority of the country’s residents as one of 
the reasons underlying the need to incorporate aspects of 
participatory democracy into its representative democracy.  People of 
color were the principal targets of the system of political and 
economic exclusion called apartheid, but white women, and gay men 
and lesbians of all colors, suffered some of its impact as well.  Many of 
the same groups have been the targets of political and economic 
exclusion in other countries, including the United States.74 Making 
room at the political table for historically silenced groups may be 
essential to the functioning of a good government, as the court in 
Doctors for Life argues. At the same time, making room is important 
 
 72. Id.  See generally MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, 
EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN LAW (1990); Barbara Bezdek, Silence in the Court: Participation 
and Subordination of Poor Tenants’ Voices in Legal Process, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 533 (1991-
92). 
 73. See, e.g., SUSAN  MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE FAMILY 110-33 (1989); 
CAROLE PATEMAN, THE DISORDER OF WOMEN: DEMOCRACY, FEMINISM AND POLITICAL 
THEORY 118-40 (1989). 
 74. See, e.g., PATEMAN, supra note 73; Mary G. Dietz, Hannah Arendt and Feminist 
Politics, in FEMINIST INTERPRETATIONS AND POLITICAL THEORY 232-52 (Mary Lyndon 
Shanley & Carole Pateman eds., 1991); Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335 (Colo. 1994) 
(overturning referendum adopted by state’s voters that prohibited legislature from adopting 
measures to protect people from discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation as a denial of 
the fundamental right to participate equally in the political process), upheld on different 
grounds, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).  Compare Lynn A. Baker, Direct Democracy and Discrimination: 
A Public Choice Perspective, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 707 (1991) (rejecting the claim that laws 
created by referenda are more likely to produce discrimination than laws created by elected 
officials) with Derrick A. Bell, Jr., The Referendum: Democracy’s Barrier to Racial Equality, 54 
WASH. L. REV. 1 (1978-79) (suggesting the trend towards using referenda to create laws 
promotes racial inequality). 
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for the members of these historically silenced groups as well, another 
point raised by the court in Doctors for Life. Many feminists have 
focused on the liberating value for women of coming together in 
groups and argued that feminist method must include collectively 
respectful encounters.75 
Whether historically silenced groups will find room for political 
participation and influence because of Doctors for Life is uncertain.  
Making that happen will require legislators to take the mandate 
seriously and reach out to groups affected by proposed controversial 
legislation. It will also require members of those groups to find reason 
to trust the process and agree to participate. If legislators reach out, 
and if they attend respectfully to the input they receive, the decision 
could increase the incentives and opportunities for historically 
silenced people to come together, collaboratively determine their 
views and position and share them with legislators. If, on the other 
hand, legislators do not take the mandate seriously, will women and 
other members of disadvantaged groups be worse off? The answer to 
that question depends, of course, on the nature of the controversies in 
which Doctors for Life should have an impact and on the differences 
between the limited deliberative democratic participation envisioned 
by the Doctors for Life court and the more limited practice of 
representative democracy. 
An additional criticism of deliberative democracy is that it 
contributes little to the achievement of economic justice.76 Cass 
Sunstein has argued that assuming the absence of a relationship 
between civil rights and economic rights is a “large error.”77 He points 
to the Amartya Sens’ finding that famine does not occur in a society 
with political safeguards against tyranny, because a government with 
an incentive to listen to its citizens is more likely to adopt pro-social 
welfare policies. At the same time, Sunstein cautions, a democratic 
system may insulate great wealth by allowing wealthy citizens to, in 
 
 75. Dietz, supra note 74; OKIN, supra note 73, at 124-33; Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist 
Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV. 829 (1989-90).  Cf. Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Creating a Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission for Lynching, 21 LAW & INEQ. 263 (2003). 
 76. The notion that deliberative democracy can contribute to the achievement of social 
rights is not self-evident, but some commentators point to a connection, particularly in the need 
to “integrate groups that were improperly marginalized by the political system.” See Roberto 
Gargarella, Should Deliberative Democrats Defend the Judicial Enforcement of Social Rights?, 
in DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY AND ITS DISCONTENTS 244-51 (Samantha Besson & José Luis 
Martí eds., 2006). 
 77. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE SECOND BILL OF RIGHTS: FDR’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 
AND WHY WE NEED IT MORE THAN EVER 184 (2004). 
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effect, buy greater access to decisionmakers. Avoiding that result 
requires, at least, capacity building so that citizens are adequately 
educated and enjoy some modest degree of economic security.78 
A more extended consideration of the relationship between 
public participation and economic justice is offered by James 
Bohman,79 who argues that, since democratic deliberation is 
incompatible with persistent inequality, “the norm of political 
equality in deliberation serves as a critical standard of democratic 
legitimacy.”80  In his view, “persistent inequalities of race, class, and 
gender are not merely the results of the unequal distribution of 
resources; they are also due to the lack of social agency by these 
groups in relation to the goals and interests of others.”81 Ignored as 
agents in the public debate, the interests and needs of these groups 
are also ignored. The solution is not solely economic, therefore; it also 
requires that government ensure that a threshold of resources and 
capacities are provided to each citizen so that he or she is not ignored 
and can make his or her public reasons convincing to others.82 
Guaranteeing the capacity of individual citizens to participate 
does not guarantee positive results in terms of economic justice, but it 
opens the door for individuals to make the connections with others 
that are necessary to achieve common goals. Acknowledging the 
necessity of collective action, Bohman asserts that government may 
have a role in developing opportunities for collectivities to organize 
and make their views a part of the public debate.83 Interestingly, the 
judgment in Doctors for Life asks the government to consider, at 
least, whether it must provide funding and other resources to groups 
to assist them in providing input on relevant legislation. Assuming the 
answer is positive, these groups will have much more potential for 
advancing their claims to economic, social and cultural rights. While 
Doctors for Life does not demand this, it seems obvious that, if the 
process of facilitating input is to be meaningful over time, 
government must assist people with similar issues and problems to 
come together to advocate for their views and to make their needs 
known to legislators. This must occur not just when an election occurs 
but frequently over the course of the life of the parliament. The 
 
 78. Id. at 184-85. 
 79. BOHMAN, supra note 66. 
 80. Id. at 125. 
 81. Id. at 130. 
 82. See id. at 131. 
 83. See id. at 141. 
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process may increase the capacity of groups in civil society who face 
some of the greatest economic, social and cultural disadvantage.84 It 
may give members of this group reasons to see themselves as citizens 
and to develop the skills and self-respect necessary for fuller 
participation in society.  Developing civil society in this way can be 
seen as a type of capacity building that is as important in the long run 
as other forms of capacity building advocated by Sunstein. 
Another reason to think that the judgment in Doctors for Life is 
not unrelated to the achievement of social and economic rights is that 
the South African Constitution, unlike the constitutions of most 
countries, protects social and economic rights and makes them 
judicially enforceable.85 When social and economic rights are not 
justiciable, courts have little incentive to be concerned with whether 
the legislative process is open to hearing claims from disadvantaged 
groups about their needs for economic and social justice. Where the 
court is an alternative forum for the achievement of economic and 
social justice, however, it is in the best interests of judges for the 
legislature to be seen as an appropriate and responsive institution for 
such claims.  With its judgment in Doctors for Life, the South African 
Constitutional Court could be seen as encouraging Parliament to 
become more open and responsive to claims for economic and social 
justice and to relieve the Court of having to take on the primary role.  
As the South African Constitutional Court has seen, tasking courts 
with enforcing social and economic rights is tricky; for example, the 
South African Constitutional Court lacks the power to appropriate 
funds and create organizations to implement its judgments.86 The 
 
 84. An important example of the government assisting the development of civil society 
occurred during the War on Poverty in the United States in the latter part of the 1960s, when 
the Office of Economic Opportunity devoted resources to help communities create and sustain 
local advocacy and service organizations.  These organizations included welfare rights groups, 
which were successful, for a time, in expanding access by low-income women to public benefits.  
See FELICIA KORNBLUH, THE BATTLE FOR WELFARE RIGHTS: POLITICS AND POVERTY IN 
MODERN AMERICA 33-36 (2006). 
 85. See generally Balakrishnan Rajagopal, Pro-Human Rights but Anti-Poor? A Critical 
Evaluation of the Indian Supreme Court from a Social Movement Perspective, 8 HUM. RTS. REV. 
157 (2007) (discussing judicial practice in India and comparing it to other countries); Robin 
West, Katrina, The Constitution, and the Legal Question Doctrine, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1127 
(2006) (discussing Constitutional jurisprudence in the United States). 
 86. Taunya Lovell Banks, Balancing Competing Individual Constitutional Rights: Raising 
Some Questions, in LAW AND RIGHTS: GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES ON CONSTITUTIONALISM AND 
GOVERNANCE 27, 37 (Penelope E. Andrews & Susan Brazilli eds., 2008) (“[T]he Constitutional 
Court’s approach to the enforcement of socio-economic rights is cautious and largely declarative 
rather than transformative.”); Dennis Davis, Adjudicating the Socio-Economic Rights in the 
South African Constitution: Toward “Deference Lite?”, 22 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 301 (2006). 
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same lack of institutional capacity is viewed by many countries as 
exactly the reason not to make social and economic rights judicially 
enforceable.87 With Doctors for Life, the Constitutional Court may 
have begun to explore a middle ground: remaining open to 
adjudicating social and economic rights claims while simultaneously 
articulating how the legislature can do a better job of addressing the 
same rights.88 
IV. CASE STUDIES FROM THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA AND SOUTH AFRICA 
A. Case Study – South Africa 
In Doctors for Life, the Court acknowledged the existence of, 
and affirmed the benefits of, the notion of public participation 
through many forums and at different times. However, the Court 
recognized that there is a problem in the legislative process, and that 
this was not the first case that raised the issue of an omission to 
facilitate public participation by the legislature.89 But this was the first 
case that led to the striking down of legislation due to the failure to 
facilitate public participation. 
Since its inception, the post-apartheid Parliament has faced 
criticisms about its public participation processes. Some of the 
criticisms include the inaccessibility of Parliament for people who do 
not live in the city where it is situated, the lack of adequate public 
information, the short time-frames for public inputs in many 
instances, the lack of responsiveness of the legislature to inputs, and 
the lack of consultation at the provincial and local levels. Peter 
Kimemia, in a recent critique of public participation in South Africa, 
 
 87. See generally Rajagopal, supra note 85 (discussing judicial practice in India and 
comparing it to other countries). 
 88. An important critique of deliberative democracy is that, as deliberative processes 
increase, the speed of legislative process and the power of experts to decide policy both decline.  
The question is whether the tradeoff is worthwhile.  One part of the response is that the answer 
to the question is political, not empirical.  What the Doctors for Life Court assumes, it appears, 
is that the political claim was decided in favor of deliberation when the constitution was 
adopted. It is hard to make same claim, of course, based on the language of the US 
Constitution. At the same time, given how slowly important legislation has moved through 
Congress in recent years despite the absence of a mandatory process for public input, the 
efficiency claims may not be empirically accurate even if the writers of the US Constitution 
were satisfied as a political matter with representative democracy. 
 89. Doctors for Life Int’l v the Speaker of the Nat’l Assembly & Others 2006 (12) BCLR 
1399 (CC) at 36-37 (S. Afr.). 
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argues that what passes as a participatory process can be described as 
manipulation, tokenism and a “crafty means by which to dispense 
with this rather irritating and tedious process of facilitating public 
participation in governance practice.”90 Themba Fosi, an employee of 
the Department of Provincial and Local Government, has 
acknowledged that, despite efforts at facilitating participation, the 
actual process has led to minimal participation by the public. Included 
amongst the challenges he identifies is the fact that “the spaces and in 
some cases the means provided to facilitate public participation are 
fraught with flaws that effectively swell the potential for failure.”91 
The comments above indicate that the constitutional inclusion of 
a mandatory duty to facilitate public participation has led to 
implementation challenges within all spheres of government. 
Fortunately for South Africa, the Chapter 9 institutions also have a 
role to play in strengthening democracy, through, amongst other 
means, the facilitation of public participation in the legislative 
process. As discussed above, the CGE and the SAHRC both have 
Parliamentary Offices which undertake this task. Both institutions 
have faced internal and external challenges and criticisms in 
interpreting and implementing their mandates in this regard. 
Nevertheless, these institutions have a crucial role to play, for several 
reasons: they have the means to provide a forum for public education, 
they are able to facilitate public participation, and they can mediate 
easier access to the relevant legislative structures and individuals for 
civil society actors. These institutions also have offices in all provinces 
and are generally more accessible to the public. The case study below 
seeks to illustrate one successful attempt at facilitating public 
participation by a Chapter 9 institution. Despite the intervention 
taking place prior to the judgement in Doctors for Life, the 
methodology employed resonates with the views of the Court on what 
the Legislature ought to have done in fulfilling its mandate. 
This case study reflects the legislative intervention process 
undertaken by the South African Human Rights Commission 
(SAHRC) on legislation relating to older persons known as the Older 
Persons Bill.92 The SAHRC has acknowledged that this is the first 
 
 90. Peter Kimenia, South Africa: Public Participation – Need for a Re-definition, LOC. 
GOV’T TRANSFORMER, Oct./Nov. 2007, available at http://www.africafiles.org/article.asp?ID=1 
6327. See generally Parliamentary statements and Annual Reports of the Commission for 
Gender Equality, www.cge.org.za. 
 91. Kimenia, supra note 90. 
 92. Older Persons Bill, 2003, Bill B68B-2003 (GA). 
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time that they have consulted so extensively on a piece of legislation.93 
In fulfilling its constitutional mandate, the SAHRC in this instance 
recognised that the older persons sector is organisationally weak, that 
older persons lacked resources such as access to information, forums 
and funding, that there was no national structure or advocacy group 
to take up the broader systemic concerns of older persons, and that 
older persons are autonomous individuals and that their participation 
is crucial in all matters concerning their group. This latter provision is 
prescribed in terms of the United Nations Principles for Older 
Persons and also the Madrid Program of Action on Aging. Hence, in 
line with both their constitutional mandate and also international 
instruments, the SAHRC embarked on an in-depth process in 
relation to the Older Persons Bill. The other reason for embarking on 
such an in-depth process was based on institutional concerns relating 
to the limitations in the Bill, including the lack of a developmental 
approach. The focus of the Bill was on facilities for older persons as 
opposed to a holistic focus on the numerous concerns facing older 
people living in communities and families. 
The SAHRC intervention started in 2001 when general 
consultations began taking place with various NGOs. A pilot 
workshop was held in 2003, followed thereafter by workshops 
throughout the country between 2003 and 2005. A special focus in this 
respect was to include rural communities in the consultation process. 
The number of participants in workshops ranged from 18 to 80 and 
included representatives from organisations, municipalities, 
traditional leaders, NGOs, activists, academics, policymakers, church 
groups, and homes for older persons. The workshops had two 
purposes: to empower older persons with knowledge about 
Parliamentary processes both at the national and the provincial levels 
and to share information on the draft law and elicit participants’ 
views on that law. Because this latter process would serve to inform 
the SAHRC’s submission to Parliament, the workshop programmes 
included information on how laws are made, how to write and present 
submissions to the legislature, background information on and 
provisions contained in the draft Bill, the applicable human rights and 
international law aspects on the rights of older persons, and the 
sharing of information on positive changes in South Africa since 1994. 
The workshops also elicited information from participants on the 
 
 93. See Older Persons Bill: Hearing on B68B-2003 Before the Portfolio Comm. On Social 
Development, 1 (2005) (Oral Submission of S. Afr. Human Rights Comm’n). 
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current challenges facing older persons. These challenges included 
pension issues, health issues, HIV/AIDS, accommodation and care 
issues, and abuse and neglect issues. During these workshops, the 
SAHRC received repeated requests from participants for assistance 
in setting up a national older persons’ forum.94 
In addition to the workshops, the Parliamentary Office of the 
SAHRC also held a series of brainstorming sessions with a smaller 
group of people. The objective of these sessions was to have more in-
depth discussions on specific aspects of the Bill. These sessions 
consisted of between 8 and 15 people and dealt with both the 
substance of the draft Bill and law-making processes. Experts were 
also invited to present short inputs on both the Bill and share 
successful advocacy strategies. A workshop was held on public 
participation in the legislative process, and sessions included input on 
developing advocacy and submission writing skills. All discussions 
were recorded and the notes were widely distributed to relevant role-
players. The Parliamentary Office also established the Rights of 
Older Persons Working Group, which was an email information 
service for relevant role-players and served as an information 
clearing-house on the progress of the Bill. Individuals and 
communities were encouraged, through all these processes, to 
participate in the parliamentary process.95 
At a national conference on older persons which was held in 
2005, a discussion was held on the need for a national structure that 
would represent the diverse needs and interests of older persons. The 
SAHRC agreed to set up (internally) an Older Persons Unit to assist 
the older persons sector in creating a national forum within a year. It 
provided assistance with fund-raising, as well as administrative 
support. The objective of the Older Persons National Forum is to act 
as a civil society advocacy and advisory group that works to promote 
the rights of older persons. 
In August 2005, Parliament held extensive public hearings on the 
Older Persons Bill. As a result of the submissions received, the 
Parliamentary Committee sent the Bill back to the drafters, with an 
instruction to re-draft the Bill, taking into account the concerns 
raised. After the re-drafted Bill was submitted to Parliament, the 
SAHRC was asked to bring any further concerns to the attention of 
 
 94. South African Human Rights Commission [SAHRC], Case Study - The Older Persons 
Bill 10 (undated & unpublished document, on file with authors). 
 95. Id. 
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the Parliamentary Committee. A one-day workshop was convened in 
January 2006 by the Parliamentary Office to gather any outstanding 
concerns, and the report from this workshop was submitted to 
Parliament. The Parliamentary Office also attended and monitored 
all the Parliamentary Committee meetings and sent out reports to 
relevant role-players. This was a valuable initiative, as it greatly 
assisted civil society to stay informed and to actively participate both 
directly and indirectly, on issues that concerned them.96 
Included in the successes achieved by this new mode of 
Parliamentary intervention by the SAHRC were the following: 
a) The SAHRC received over 300 written and oral 
submissions in all these interventions, from both individuals 
and groups/organisations. These submissions were used to 
inform the SAHRC’s official submission to Parliament. 
b) The process also led to a working relationship with the 
relevant government department dealing with the draft Bill 
and the provision of direct inputs to the drafters. 
c) The SAHRC estimates that 90% of all oral submissions 
presented in Parliament were by persons and organisations 
that had participated in their various activities listed above.97 
d) In terms of substance, the structure of the Bill was 
changed to shift the focus from institutional care to a more 
developmental focus, including new provisions addressing the 
issue of elder abuse. The law was passed in December of 
2006. 
e) The intervention had an invaluable impact in terms of 
building coalitions and community solidarity in the mission to 
protect the rights of a vulnerable constituency.98 
The above case study illustrates both an effective methodology in 
facilitating public participation as well as a powerful vehicle that can 
work in tandem with the legislature to fulfil this constitutional 
obligation. In a country with competing demands and limited 
resources, the Chapter 9 institutions are ideally situated to 
supplement and compliment the role of the legislature in facilitating 
public participation, thereby fulfilling a constitutional imperative. 
B. Case Study—United States of America 
An example from the United States may shed some light on the 
differences between the ordinary legislative process in the US and 
 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
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what might occur if the legislative practices mandated in Doctors for 
Life were adopted. In the example, one of the authors of this article 
unsuccessfully attempted to persuade a local legislator to change a 
social welfare policy affecting low-income individuals and families. 
In Montgomery County, Maryland, some low-income parents 
can qualify for a child care subsidy to assist them in purchasing child 
care while they are at work. Only single-parent households are 
eligible. In addition to financial eligibility, each applicant parent is 
required either to have a judicial child support order or to undertake 
the process of suing the nonresidential parent for child support.99 
In 2003, when the county was considering an ordinance to renew 
the program, I contacted one of the county’s council members to 
advocate for eliminating the child support requirement.  According to 
the council member and members of the council staff, the 
requirement is imposed in the interest of serving more families. The 
amount of the subsidy that each family receives varies according to 
the family’s income. If one family has more income, the family’s 
subsidy can be less and the excess money can be used for a second 
family. Child support can be included as a source of income for the 
recipient family. In terms of horizontal equity, enhancing the income 
of some families helps more families receive subsidies.100 
Nonetheless, whether more families would actually be served 
because of the child support requirement is unclear because the 
nonresident fathers of children in the care of low-income custodial 
mothers tend to not have substantial resources from which child 
support can be paid. As a result, child support actually collected 
under court orders may not raise the household incomes of a 
sufficient number of households to make a difference in terms of 
subsidy money for other households.101 
 
 99. MONTGOMERY, MD. CODE § 02.42A.06 (2008). 
 100. The horizontal equity argument has some appeal since more families apply for the 
program than the funding can serve.  In 2007, more than $11,000,000 was budgeted for the 
program to serve approximately 1800 children. MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD., OFFICE OF 
MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, COUNTY EXECUTIVE’S RECOMMENDED FY09 OPERATING 
BUDGET AND PUBLIC SERVICES PROGRAM 53-3 (2008).  Only three years earlier, the program 
had 179 families with 268 families on a waiting list.  DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUM. SERVS., 
MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD., CHILD CARE SUBSIDY PROGRAMS COMMUNITY REVIEW 
(2004), available at http://www.montgomerycountymd.gov/content/hhs/ACS/Documents/childca 
resubsfinalreport.doc. 
 101. See, e.g., Karen Syma Czapanskiy, ALI Child  Support Principles: A Lesson In Public 
Policy and Truth-Telling, 8 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 259, 265-66 (2001); Daniel L. Hatcher, 
Child Support Harming Children: Subordinating the Best Interests of Children to the Fiscal 
Interests of the State, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1029, 1073-74 (2007) (arguing that 
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Many, perhaps most, custodial parents have no problem with the 
child support cooperation requirement, at least on a theoretical level.  
Along with some commentators, many parents believe that 
establishing the paternity of a child’s nonmarital father and requiring 
a formal child support order is good for the child as well as the 
parent.102 Some custodial parents, however, have concluded that 
obtaining child support from the nonresident parent is a bad idea, 
even though any child support actually paid would relieve some of the 
custodial parent’s financial burden.  Some custodial parents are afraid 
that the nonresidential parent will threaten the child or the parent, 
either physically or emotionally, or counterclaim for custody.103 Other 
parents are receiving some informal support, at least on an occasional 
basis, either from the nonresidential parent or that parent’s family, 
which may stop when judicial proceedings begin.104 Furthermore, the 
judicial process is time-consuming and conflicts, in many cases, with 
employment. Finally, many nonresidential parents are as poor as the 
custodial parent. Getting a judicial order, therefore, offers no promise 
of money reaching the custodial parent.105 
The county council member seemed unaware of how the 
requirement impinged on the life and the autonomy of custodial 
parents, a life he had never shared. Persuaded by the horizontal 
equity argument, he was willing to consider changing the requirement 
only if affected parents could persuade him that it was burdensome to 
them. He suggested I find affected parents and bring them in to speak 
with him or to testify at a hearing. 
The council member’s suggestion is not unreasonable in theory, 
but it makes little sense in the context of a child care subsidy program 
 
administrative costs substantially reduce any benefit from child support); Chien-Chung Huang, 
Ronald Mincy, Ronald & Irwin Garfinkel, Child Support Obligation of Low Income Fathers, 67 
J. MARR. & FAM. 1213 (2005). 
 102. See Nancy E. Dowd, Parentage at Birth: Birthfathers and Social Fatherhood, 14 WM. & 
MARY BILL RTS. J. 909 (2006); Memorandum from Paula Roberts, Ctr. For Law & Soc. Policy, 
to Interested People, Preliminary Analysis of Child Care Support Cooperation as a Condition of 
Eligibility for Subsidized Child Care (Nov. 19, 2004), available at http://www.clasp.org/publicatio 
ns/cs_cc_subsidy.pdf (reviewing pros and cons of imposing requirement). 
 103. Having been involved in representing women who had been battered by partners, I 
knew this was not a purely theoretical concern.  It finds support in the scholarly literature.  See 
SHARON HAYS, FLAT BROKE WITH CHILDREN: WOMEN IN THE AGE OF WELFARE REFORM 
82-83 (2003); Karen Syma Czapanskiy, Domestic Violence and the Maryland Family Violence 
Option, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 447 (2003); Susan Notar & Sharon Turetsky, 
Models for Safe Child Support Enforcement, 8 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y. & L. 657 (2000). 
 104. HAYS, supra note 103, at 80-81. 
 105. See Czapanskiy, supra note 101. 
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or many other public benefits programs.106 Because public benefits 
records are kept private to protect applicants and recipients from 
stigma, I had no access to the names of or contact information for 
applicants who were refused benefits. A student helped find several 
parents in the waiting room of the office, and we provided their 
statements to the council member. Given that each was a busy low-
income woman supporting a family, none was able to take time from 
work and family to speak personally with a county council member 
who had never listened to her before. Of course, an organization of 
low-income women could have advocated on their behalf, but, 
probably for all the same reasons that low-income women historically 
have had little voice in public debates, such organizations do not seem 
to exist in this locale. 
Under the mandate of Doctors for Life, the county council might 
have been required to solicit the opinions of people who are 
financially eligible for the child care subsidy. Alternatively, an 
intermediating institution, such as a women’s commission, might have 
been asked to investigate the issue from the perspective of financially 
eligible parents. The government agency that administers the 
program could have been directed to identify applicants for and 
participants in the program, so that legislators or the intermediating 
institution could seek their input.  If stigma were an important issue, 
the intermediating institution might have sought input without 
identifying low-income parents in public, while still allowing their 
opinions to be heard. The agency might have also been required to 
advise participants about the interest of the legislature because of the 
requirement. When we asked the agency to make our interest as 
advocates known to participants, the director turned us down, which 
 
 106. Another advocacy project I was involved with around the same time involved 
extending unemployment insurance benefits (UIB) to part-time workers on the same basis as 
provided for fulltime workers.  Finding people denied UIB was even more difficult than finding 
disappointed applicants for the child care subsidy program. Applications were taken only over 
the phone, and applicants were required to work through a telephone decision tree before 
speaking with a claims representative. The decision tree was unambiguous when it comes to 
benefits for part-time workers. Applicants were told that they are ineligible for benefits, and 
they were provided with no opportunity to contest the decision. They are not connected with a 
claims representative to talk over the issue, and they are not provided with a denial letter.  
Because they were never informed that the question might be decided differently if the law 
were changed (or, in a few cases, if they come within one of the exceptions to the exclusion), 
they had no incentive to create or even contact a legal or advocacy group. From the perspective 
of the unemployed worker, it must have appeared that their exclusion was inevitable and 
unquestionable. 
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was a sensible response given that no council member was demanding 
a different outcome. 
It is not impossible to imagine the Doctors for Life requirements 
being handled, at a preliminary level at least, by an administrative 
agency. Unexpectedly, that turned out to be one of the lessons that 
can be drawn from the child care subsidy example. A year after my 
failed advocacy effort, the agency conducted an internal audit of the 
child care subsidy program.107 The audit included interviews with a 
number of program participants. They were asked questions about 
the operation of the program, but they were not asked to give their 
opinion on whether the program’s requirements made sense to them.  
Program participants were interviewed individually, giving them no 
opportunity to gain an understanding of how others experienced the 
program.108 
What is interesting is that, despite these limitations, the largely 
positive audit made reference to problems with the child support 
requirement. Because of the requirement and the lack of close 
connections with the people administering the child support program, 
applications for the child care subsidy were sometimes delayed or 
made more complex. Talking with participants, then, even in the 
limited manner done here, uncovered problems. Unfortunately, the 
audit did not lead to a reconsideration of the requirement. 
One thing seems clear from this example: without some mandate 
to take into account the views of people who experience some form of 
disadvantage in the political system, legislators are likely to accept as 
valid the views of those who share their perspectives. The county 
council member, while not an unreasonable or unsympathetic person, 
was willing, without much curiosity or even imagination, to discount 
arguments about the unsuitability of the requirement for purported 
beneficiaries of the benefit. The people whose views did not count in 
the conversation were members of disadvantaged groups: most are 
female and all are low-income. 
 
 107. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUM. SERVS., supra note 100. 
 108. Id. at 3. Cf. YOUNG, supra note 69, at 60-74 (discussing deliberative democracy as an 
example of social learning happening in conversation with others who share the experience); 
Shannon, supra note 50 (discussing political participation as a method of social learning 
happening in conversation with others who share the experience). 
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C. Reflections on the case studies from South Africa and the United 
States of America 
The process leading to the adoption of the Older Persons Bill 
contrasts rather sharply with the US experience. In both countries, 
the proposed legislation primarily affected people with few economic 
resources.  The South African legislation addressed a large number of 
issues affecting an important group of people in the population, which 
helps to explain the significant amount of consideration it was given 
by the executive department, the SAHRC and advocacy groups.  The 
US example involved modest changes to an existing program, which 
helps to explain why the attention paid to the proposal was not 
substantial. In both countries, however, the judgment in Doctors for 
Life would have made a difference in the process and in the outcome. 
In South Africa, the adoption of a more expansive and 
consultative process by the SAHRC reflected a shift in the 
methodology regarding public participation. As noted above, this was 
not due to the judgment in Doctors for Life, but rather to the 
identification of problems in the draft law and also the recognition 
that the older persons sector was not sufficiently well-organized to 
make an impact on its own. The judgment in Doctors for Life 
confirmed that the nature of South Africa’s democracy was 
participatory, inclusive and responsive, and that the values of dignity 
and respect are engendered by public participation in the law-making 
process. Both the imposition of a constitutional mandate to facilitate 
public participation, and the creation of constitutional bodies to 
strengthen democracy, allow for the realization of deliberative 
democracy goals. The existence of a court with the power to oversee 
the implementation of the Constitution also assists enormously in this 
mission. 
In the absence of a judgment such as Doctors for Life, the 
Constitutional Court would likely face similar complaints in the 
future. The striking down of laws in this case serves to send a stronger 
message to the Legislature regarding a violation of its constitutional 
mandate. This will hopefully lead to greater awareness and changes in 
the Legislature in its future facilitation of public participation. The 
judgment also clarified that there is a mandatory duty to facilitate 
public participation and that there are two aspects to this duty. 
Contextualizing the duty in terms of human rights obligations as well 
as historical and contextual approaches is another innovative aspect 
of the judgment. The recognition of political citizenship as being 
more than just the right to vote shows respect for citizens and allows 
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for the development of a culture of ongoing deliberation amongst 
people. It also reflects the principle of government based on the will 
of the people. In the absence of the judgment and the SAHRC’s new 
approach, the outcome in the ‘Older Persons Bill’ process would have 
been different on many levels. The networking and coalition-building 
aspects would not have occurred to the same extent in the sector. The 
participation of such a diverse group of people who exercised both 
agency and their voices (in the SAHRC forums and also in 
Parliament) would have been absent. The raising of awareness in 
Parliament about the limitations of the draft law also led to changes 
to the draft law, to the benefit of a marginalized and vulnerable 
sector. 
In the United States, there is no constitutionally-based civil right 
requiring legislatures to facilitate input from affected members of the 
public. Citizens enjoy the freedom to petition the government, and 
that freedom has been held to be the basis for protection of certain 
kinds of political organizing.109 Congress has the duty to publish its 
journal, and, as a matter of accepted historical practice, Congressional 
sessions and most committee hearings are held in public.110 Nothing, 
however, requires Congress to do more than receive input; it is not 
required to seek or to facilitate input. 
Another important difference between the normal legislative 
process in South Africa and the United States is that Chapter 9 
institutions, such as the SAHRC, in South Africa sometimes use their 
constitutional mandate to bring advocates, affected groups of people 
and government officials together to discuss legislation. Sometimes 
these institutions have ongoing relationships with the various players, 
and they can use those relationships to engage more fully with them 
over a long period of time. Staff members employed by some 
congressional committees develop similar relationships over time 
with advocates, affected groups and government officials, which helps 
the legislators to include a broader set of views in the legislative 
process. 
Staff members of congressional committees, unlike the members 
of the Chapter 9 institutions,111 are chosen and supervised by the 
 
 109. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting . . . the right of the 
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”). 
 110. See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 82-83 (2005). 
 111. In terms of section 193 of the RSA Constitution, members of Ch. 9 institutions are 
appointed through a public participation process when calls for nominations are made. This is 
followed by a Parliamentary process of short-listing, interviews and a voting exercise by both 
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leadership of the committee they serve. They are subject to no 
mandate requiring them to pay attention to the views of people or 
organizations that are different from the views of the committee’s 
legislators. Of course, if a legislator ignores input from people who 
disagree with him or her, the legislator may pay the price at election 
time. But the process of deliberation between elections, which is the 
subject of Doctors for Life, can be ignored. 
As discussed earlier, practices that fall within the broad ambit of 
deliberative or communicative democracy can have a substantial 
positive impact on a society in which they are practiced. They can 
bring people together to articulate, discuss and compare their 
experiences and views. They can help people develop self-respect for 
themselves as citizens and respect and empathy for others in the 
society. They can encourage the development of civil society which 
then serves to limit government intrusiveness. They can add to the 
incentives for government to find solutions to economic and social 
inequalities and injustices. 
One of the goals of deliberative democracy, in a political sense, is 
“illuminating conflicts, including conflicts in material self-interest that 
might previously have been obscured.”112 Unless the door is pried 
open for people, the illumination cannot occur. Doctors for Life 
offers that possibility by requiring legislators to seek input. Although 
it does not guarantee that any conflict will be resolved differently, the 
decision makes it harder for legislators to argue that opposing 
viewpoints do not exist and do not merit some reply. 
Doctors for Life offers another potential benefit: the chance for 
people to organize around an issue of importance in their lives.  
Under the mandate, legislators are instructed to reach out to groups 
of affected people. What if no groups exist? It may be necessary for 
legislators to provide educational opportunities for people to learn 
about the policies under consideration and to give people the 
opportunity to debate among themselves which policies they prefer.  
This process can produce a chance for organization around common 
interests and connections among people with existing organizations.  
Once organizations develop in civil society that include people who 
have been marginalized in the political system, it is harder for the 
 
Houses of Parliament. The names of nominees are then submitted to the State President for 
assent and appointment. 
 112. Jane Mansbridge, Conflict and Self-Interest in Deliberation, in DELIBERATIVE 
DEMOCRACY AND ITS DISCONTENTS 107, 128 (Samantha Besson & José Luis Martí eds., 2006). 
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disadvantage to continue; political actors begin to pay a price for 
ignoring the interests of those people in the future. 
These benefits are well demonstrated in the process leading to 
the adoption of the Older Persons Bill. Even thought the bill was 
developed prior to the judgment in Doctors for Life, the process was 
similar. The SAHRC reached out to affected people who, at the time, 
were poorly organized in terms of capacity for political input. The 
SAHRC assisted, through outreach, education and workshops, in 
learning about the views and perspectives of affected groups. It 
organized conversations with and without agendas. It received input 
orally and in writing from affected groups, advocates and experts.  
Even with all of that outreach, its submission to Parliament was not 
fully accepted.  Continuing the process of seeking and incorporating 
input, the SAHRC and parliamentary committees finally arrived at an 
acceptable bill. Acceptable, in this context, has both a substantive and 
procedural meaning. Given the nature of the deliberative democratic 
process that underlies the bill, it seems highly likely that all 
stakeholders must have felt respected as citizens throughout the 
process. Most probably saw their views adopted on at least a few 
points, and everyone likely had a chance to learn about the views of 
people quite different from themselves.  It seems unlikely that anyone 
who participated or who will be affected by the bill will come to the 
conclusion that the bill was adopted in a vacuum far from the 
perspectives and experiences of those it attempts to assist. It also 
seems unlikely that anyone who participated will conclude that they 
cannot seek to influence legislation in the future. Furthermore, the 
process resulted in the creation of an institution in civil society that is 
concerned with issues affecting older persons and could have an 
ongoing relationship with older persons and the legislative process. 
On the flip side, Doctors for Life demonstrates the potential 
losses to a society that has not adopted deliberative democratic 
processes as part of the legislative process. In the US example, the 
only deliberation was one-sided. Legislators were willing to hear the 
input of advocates, but they did nothing to facilitate input by the 
affected groups. The affected group was, like the older persons in 
South Africa, politically impoverished. That is, they had no 
organization in civil society that either represented them or sought 
their views as advocates.113 Nor could they find each other, given the 
 
 113. Underrepresentation of economically disadvantaged people in pressure politics is a 
common phenomenon.  See Kay Lehman Schlozman, Benjamin I. Page, Sidney Verba & Morris 
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privacy rules that surround public benefits programs. In both cases, 
legislators could have facilitated input by requiring government to 
identify affected persons and seek their views. 
By not reaching out to members of the affected groups and 
facilitating their input, the legislator in the US example reached a 
conclusion that failed to improve the economic situation of low-
income mothers without ever hearing from those women. He lost an 
opportunity to bring low-income women into the political process and 
give them a sense that they could make a difference in that process.  
He reinforced their silence and denied them an opportunity to 
develop politically, either as individuals or as members of a group. It 
seems questionable that these women will find a reason to connect to 
the political process during their lifetimes, given their not 
unreasonable conclusion that their views matter little to anyone with 
power.114 At the same time, the political process is impoverished by 
their absence. Legislators and others in the political process cannot 
learn the views of people who do not participate, and they are not 
required to develop empathy or to rethink their positions. Finally, the 
legitimacy of programs that are created to serve low-income women 
cannot be assured, as the next few paragraphs will discuss. 
While the judgment in Doctors for Life could lead to greater 
participation in the legislative process in the US, it should be noted 
that the historical and social contexts in the US differ from those in 
South Africa. In the eighteenth century, when representative 
democracy was adopted as the basic process for democratic 
participation in the US, it was a bold innovation. When South Africa, 
in its late twentieth century constitution, increased democratic 
participation by adding participatory processes to a representative 
democracy, it too was making a bold innovation. If the US follows 
suit, it should be for reasons that acknowledge the changed US 
political and social landscape and the need for changes in democratic 
practices. 
The South African context includes, as the court in Doctors for 
Life said, the history of apartheid, during which the voices of most of 
the country’s residents were suppressed, both by law and by violence.  
 
P. Fiorina, Inequalities of Political Voice, in INEQUALITY AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: WHAT 
WE KNOW AND WHAT WE NEED TO LEARN 19, 54 (Lawrence R. Jacobs & Theda Skocpol eds., 
2005). 
 114. Recipients of public benefits are underrepresented among politically active people in 
the United States, including electoral and non-electoral actions, such as getting in touch with 
elected officials.  See id. at 43. 
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Without an authentic invitation to participate, many in the country 
could continue to believe that their voices are unwelcome. In the 
United States, a minority of residents have effectively been excluded 
from the public sphere, even after de jure exclusion from voting came 
to an end. That minority includes many people of color and people of 
limited means, many of whom still fail to engage with the electoral 
process. Their disengagement from the political process may reveal a 
level of distrust of government similar to what the majority of South 
Africa’s citizens experienced prior to 1994. Alienation at that level 
cannot be combated by elected officials announcing a willingness to 
receive input. More must be done. Reaching out directly to low-
turnout communities to engage with them in social inquiry, to ask 
people to come together, to discuss their views and communicate a 
position – all techniques suggested by the Court in Doctors for Life – 
may be a necessary first step.  Doing this regularly and supporting the 
necessary institutions of civil society may produce even better results 
over a longer term. Obviously, this approach requires resources and 
commitment by government. Given the history and context in the US, 
where relatively smaller groups than in South Africa have 
experienced deep political alienation, the effort should be both 
affordable and worthwhile. There is no need for government to 
support the political development of the many groups in the US that 
already enjoy extensive access to legislators through means such as 
lobbying, think tanks, advocacy groups and campaign contributions.  
Unlike in South Africa, where the majority was excluded, efforts in 
the US can be focused on historically excluded groups. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court in Doctors for Life looked to international and 
regional human rights instruments for guidance on the parameters 
and importance of citizen participation in the legislative process.  
Through its decision, the Court has also advanced our understanding 
of respect and dignity as components of political citizenship in the 
international human rights context, with lessons of importance to 
both old and new democracies. 
The court stressed that legislatures must facilitate input, and not 
simply wait for people to provide it between elections. By inviting 
participation, legislators not only garner information on which to base 
better legislation, they also express their respect for the citizens 
whom they consult. In turn, those citizens may become more engaged 
and less apathetic about public life. The two-way street contemplated 
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by the Court in Doctors for Life envisions a robust two-way ongoing 
connection between legislators and citizens, something quite different 
from the representative democracy commonly associated with civil 
and political rights in both the domestic and international human 
rights arena. 
It is not difficult to imagine, as we have done in this article, how 
the mandate of Doctors for Life could change political practices by 
legislators. What seems somewhat more difficult to imagine is 
whether the political practices by ordinary citizens would also change.  
Will citizens experience themselves as having more opportunities to 
influence legislators if invited to participate? If a change in perception 
occurs, will more citizens participate? Will more advocacy 
organizations develop in civil society? Will more citizens participate 
as voters and as candidates in elections, or otherwise express more 
political interest? Will historically disadvantaged and silenced groups 
be heard more frequently in public life, and will their interests be 
better advanced in public policy? 
While we have become convinced, through our examination of 
Doctors for Life, that participatory democracy is a beneficial addition 
to a representative democracy, we are not yet convinced that human 
rights norms must always encompass a duty by legislators to facilitate 
public input into legislation. Before coming to that conclusion, we 
would like to see some empirical research on our questions about 
citizen political practices. Participatory democracy, even in the 
limited form encompassed by the mandate of Doctors for Life, is an 
expensive and time-consuming enterprise. It may result in some 
unexpected policy outcomes. Some presently disadvantaged or 
silenced groups may become even more alienated from political 
activity and political power. A transformation of human rights norms 
to include participatory democracy, therefore, should be based in 
greater knowledge about what it means on the ground in countries 
with different histories and varied social and economic contexts.  
What Doctors for Life has contributed is a challenge that the 
investigation be undertaken. The experience of South Africa 
following this ground-breaking decision should be studied extensively 
in the years to come. 
 
